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I. INTRODUCTION
Gamblers wagered a staggering $4.9 billion dollars on sporting
events in Las Vegas last year.2 In a recent survey, a majority of the
American public stated that sports gambling should be legalized. 3
These trends show a clear rise in the popularity of sports gambling,
yet many do not realize that gambling substantially contributes to a
disproportionate decrease in the liberty of vulnerable populations. 4
Extensive research has shown that problem gambling is directly
linked to income and geography.5 It is evident from this research that
2. A Look Inside the Numbers of Sports Betting in the U.S. and Overseas,
SPORTS
BUSINESS
JOURNAL
(April
16,
2018),
https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2018/04/16/World-Congressof-Sports/Research.aspx (explaining that the amount of money bet on sports in Las
Vegas has risen every year since 2003 and is up 440 percent since 1984).
3. See Peter Moore, Americans: Gambling is Morally Acceptable and Should
be
Legalized,
YOUGOV
(Sept.
23,
2014,
8:36
AM),
https://today.yougov.com/topics/lifestyle/articles-reports/2014/09/23/gambling
(showing that 52 percent of Americans think that gambling in general is morally
acceptable and 67 percent think that sports gambling should be legalized).
4. See Thijs Bol et al., Income Inequality and Gambling: A Panel Study in the
United States (1980-1997), 34 SOCIOLOGICAL SPECTRUM 61 (2014) (arguing that
income inequality increases the average expenditure on gambling); But see
Elizabeth A. Freund & Irwin L. Morris, Gambling and Income Inequality in the
States, 34 THE POLICY STUDIES JOURNAL 265 (2006) (“These results suggest that
the increasing prevalence of various forms of nonlottery gambling will have little
effect on income inequality.”).
5. Natale Canale et al., Income Inequality and Adolescent Gambling Severity:
Findings from a Large-Scale Italian Representative Survey, 8 FRONTIERS IN
PSYCHOLOGY 1, 2 (2017) (“Problem gambling also has a social and geographical
gradient. For instance, adults experiencing gambling-related harm (i) live in areas
of greater deprivation, (ii) are unemployed, and (iii) have lower income.”).
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there are a variety of issues of inequality that could expand as a result
of state-sponsored sports gambling.6
In Murphy v. NCAA, the Supreme Court held that the Professional
and Amateur Sports Protection Act (“PASPA”) §3702, which
prevents States from “licens[ing]” and “authoriz[ing]” sports
gambling schemes, violated the anti-commandeering doctrine.7 The
anti-commandeering doctrine is the principle that the federal
government cannot require states or state officials to adopt or enforce
federal law.8 Congress cannot issue direct orders to the governments
of the States because it is not an enumerated power within the
Constitution. 9 The Court declared the entire statutory scheme
unconstitutional based on this violation in §3702. 10 The Court’s
opinion reinvigorated the proponents of the anti-commandeering
doctrine and drove a wedge between federal and state law.
Murphy v. NCAA highlights the stark conflict between federalism
principles and the harmful effects of legalized sports gambling.
Analysis and refinement of anti-commandeering is crucial because the
doctrine will affect future jurisprudence of hot-button issues.11 This
6. Les Bernal, Government Bookies Feed Inequality, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31,
2014, 4:39 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/01/31/the-stakesoff-the-field-and-at-the-betting-window/government-bookies-feed-inequality
(“States would not only be promoting a destructive habit for millions of Americans,
but transferring wealth from the have-nots to the haves.”) (emphasis added).
7. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S.Ct. 1461 (2018); see 28
U.S.C.A. § 3702 (1992) (“It shall be unlawful for—(1) a governmental entity to
sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law or compact, or (2)
a person to sponsor, operate, advertise, or promote, pursuant to the law or compact
of a governmental entity, a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or
wagering scheme based, directly or indirectly (through the use of geographical
references or otherwise), on one or more competitive games in which amateur or
professional athletes participate, or are intended to participate, or on one or more
performances of such athletes in such games.”) (emphasis added).
8. See Mike Maharrey, Anti-Commandeering: An Overview of Five Major
Supreme Court Cases, TENTH AMENDMENT CENTER (May 23, 2018),
https://tenthamendmentcenter.com/2018/05/23/anti-commandeering-an-overviewof-five-major-supreme-court-cases/.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.”); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (listing the
enumerated powers designated to the United States).
10. Murphy, 138 S.Ct. at 1484 (“[W]e hold that no provision of PASPA is
severable from the provision directly at issue in these cases.”).
11. See Steven Schwinn, Symposium: It’s time to abandon anticommandeering (but don’t count on this Supreme Court to do it), SCOTUSBLOG
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Article argues that the Supreme Court’s strict adherence to the anticommandeering doctrine—without taking into account the perverse
effects on the personal liberty of underprivileged United States
citizens—is unrealistic in today’s jurisprudence.
Part I (A) of this Article outlines the Supreme Court’s creation and
usage of the anti-commandeering doctrine over the last three decades.
Part I (B) outlines the background of PASPA and its demise in
Murphy v. NCAA, as well as a historical account of sports gambling
in the United States. Part II (A) examines the reasons the Supreme
Court struck down § 3702 of PASPA and the variety of effects it will
have on the poorest in society. Next, Part II (B) psychological aspects
of gambling and (C) the state budgetary incentives in the sports
gambling context will be analyzed. Lastly, (D) potential future anticommandeering contexts will be explored, and most importantly (E)
judicial solutions to combat the current inequitable balancing of
federalism and policy interests will be outlined. Unpacking the case
study of PASPA highlights that, when interpreting anticommandeering issues, the Supreme Court should realistically
counter-balance policy issues against a strict and expansive adherence
to the doctrine in order to protect the liberty of the most vulnerable in
society.
II. BACKGROUND OF ANTI-COMMANDEERING AND SPORTS
GAMBLING HISTORY
A. Maturation of the Anti-Commandeering Doctrine in Supreme
Court Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence protects the dual
system of government established in the Constitution. 12 The Court
formulated the anti-commandeering doctrine out of federal principles
to meet this objective. 13 This relatively young doctrine was
(Aug. 17, 2017, 10:44 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/08/symposium-timeabandon-anti-commandeering-dont-count-supreme- court/
(discussing
the
unworkability of the doctrine).
12. See Margaret Hu, Reverse-Commandeering, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 535,
537 (2012) (explaining the constitutionally prescribed system of shared
governance).
13. See Gregory R. Bordelon, The De-Federalization Gamble: A Workable
Anti-Commandeering Framework for States Seeking to Legalize Certain Vice
Areas, 20 ATLANTIC L.J. 103, 104 (2018) (“Generally speaking, the anti-
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established in two Supreme Court cases: New York v. United States in
199214 and Printz v. United States in 1997.15 This section summarizes
the doctrine’s Constitutional roots and its formulation in these pivotal
cases to clarify how it progressed to its current form.
1. Dual Sovereignty
The Constitution establishes federalism principles through a
system of shared governance between Congress and the states.16 This
dual sovereignty system sets out specific enumerated powers to the
federal government and leaves the remaining powers to the states.17
How to uphold this simple principle is one of “the oldest question[s]
of constitutional law.”18
The Constitution is the sole justification for a system of dualsovereignty. From an originalist perspective, state sovereignty is still
a valid principle because the Framers of the Constitution intended for
and required state ratification. In addition to this interpretive backing,
the numerous benefits of this governmental system include, but are
not limited to: (1) state government structures offer a testing grounds
and competitive framework for developing the best legislation;19 (2)
the variety of states allows for citizens to choose where to live based
on their preferences;20 (3) it allows for more political accountability
and participation;21 and (4) states provide a place where individuals

commandeering principle prevents the federal government from using states as
intermediaries to implement or execute law.”).
14. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
15. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
16. See Hu, supra note 12, at 537.
17. Id. at 546.
18. H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA.
L. REV. 633, 635 (1993) (quoting New York 505 U.S. at 149).
19. See Hu, supra note 12, at 546-47 (“State governments offer a multiplicity
of regulatory regimes, which in turn provides both a testing lab and a competitive
framework for developing the best policies.”).
20. See Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1, 51, 57 (2004) (arguing that dual sovereignty creates regulatory diversity that
benefits society).
21. See Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism
Perspective, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1648 (2006) (“Rather, the key point is that
state regulatory autonomy is needed to realize the values that federalism is typically
thought to advance, including accountability.”).
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and groups can rally against national policies and federal overreach.22
It is important to remember that these values can only be upheld in a
dual-sovereign system if states have counter-balancing power against
federal overreach.23
In addition to governmental power being vertically distributed
between federal and state government, it is horizontally spread
between the three branches of the federal government.24 The judicial
branch has increased its commitment to “polic[ing] the boundaries of
federal and state power in order to ensure that any inroads on state
sovereignty are proscribed.” 25 This boom in judicial protections of
dual-sovereignty has been called the “federalism revival” and has
“breath[ed] new life into the [Tenth] Amendment’s seemingly truistic
language.”26 The Court has the unique ability to restrain the power of
Congress and states, not explicitly from the text of the Constitution,
but from applying that “truism” to legislative action.27 This boom in
22. The Supreme Court consistently curbs the overstep of the federal
government. See e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (explaining
that the many benefits to decentralized government include that “it will be more
sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogenous society; it increases opportunity for
citizen involvement in democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and
experimentation in government; and it makes government more responsive by
putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry.”).
23. Id. (“Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of
the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in
any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal
Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.”); but see
Jose V. Romero, Jr., Pros and Cons of Federalist Set-Up, THE MANILA TIMES (Mar.
17, 2018), https://www.manilatimes.net/pros-and-cons-of-federalist-set-up/386745/
(listing potential downsides to a weaker federal government, including: the
protection of special interest groups (i.e. casinos), a greater disadvantage for poorer
states and communities (i.e. gamblers), and obstructs action on national issues (i.e.
the prevention of the spread of sports gambling)).
24. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (“In the compound republic of
America, the power surrendered by the people, is first divided between two distinct
governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and
separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The
different governments will control each other; at the same time that each will be
controlled by itself.”).
25. See Hu, supra note 12, at 548.
26. See Siegel, supra note 21, at 1630-31 (explaining judicial protection of
federalism values and how best to protect state sovereignty).
27. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1941) (“The amendment
states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered.”); see also
U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
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judicial protection of dual-sovereignty came to head in the 1990’s,
with the Rehnquist Court striking down two laws on the basis of the
anti-commandeering doctrine.
2. New York v. United States
Congress enacted the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of
1980 in order to mitigate an enlarging radioactive waste disposal
problem within the United States.28 This Act allowed states to enter
into interstate compacts or treaties restricting “the use of their disposal
facilities to waste generated within member States.” 29 Congress
believed the Act would encourage states to create formalized
relationships in order to best dispose of radioactive waste.30 By 1985,
only three states entered into formalized compacts. 31 Congress
amended the law to incentivize more states to create mechanisms to
dispose of low-level radioactive waste within their borders. 32 The
incentive at issue in New York, dubbed the “take-title provision,”
mandated state compliance with the Act by January 1, 1996 or the
state would be ordered to take ownership of all radioactive waste
within its border and be liable for all resulting damage.33
Two New York counties challenged the constitutionality of this
incentive structure because citizens within their borders opposed the
radioactive waste sites created in their home counties based on the
Act.34 The Supreme Court upheld the first two incentives but struck
down the take-title provision due to its violation of the anticommandeering doctrine.35 Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court,
reasoned that “the Constitution has never been understood to confer
upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern according to
respectively, or to the people.”); New York, 505 U.S. at 156-57 (“The Tenth
Amendment . . . restrains the power of Congress, but this limit is not derived from
the text of the Tenth Amendment itself, which . . . is essentially a tautology. Instead,
the Tenth Amendment confirms that the power of the Federal Government is subject
to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve power to the States.”).
28. Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347, 1985 amendments at Pub. L. No. 99240, 99 Stat. 1842, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b et seq.
29. New York, 505 U.S. at 151.
30. Id. at 153.
31. Id. at 151.
32. Id. at 152 (“The Act provides three types of incentives to encourage the
States to comply with their statutory obligation to provide for the disposal of waste
generated within their borders.”).
33. Id. at 153–54.
34. Id. at 154.
35. Id. at 175.
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Congress’s instructions,”36 and that the take-title provision “crossed
the line distinguishing encouragement from coercion.”37 In sum, the
Supreme Court struck down the take-title provision because States are
not required to blindly follow the directions of the Federal
Government.38
New York is significant because it established the anticommandeering doctrine within Supreme Court precedent. 39
Although the Court’s holding is limited to Congress’s ability to
compel state legislatures, the Court would expand the doctrine to
executives five years later in an equally important case, Printz v.
United States.
3. Printz v. United States
Following the assassination attempt on President Ronald Reagan,
in which Press Secretary James Brady was nearly killed, the country
gradually shifted towards stricter gun regulation.40 In 1994, Congress
passed the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act41 which required
the Attorney General of the United States to create a national
background-check system by November 30, 1998. 42 In the interim
before this national system was established, a state’s chief law
enforcement officer (“CLEO”) was required to perform the
background checks.43 Arizona and Montana CLEOs challenged the
constitutionality of the interim provision 44 and the case eventually

36. Id. at 162.
37. Id. at 175.
38. Id. at 188 (“States are not mere political subdivisions of the United States.
State governments are neither regional offices nor administrative agencies of the
Federal Government. The positions occupied by state officials appear nowhere on
the Federal Government's most detailed organizational chart. The Constitution
instead ‘leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty,’ The
Federalist No. 39, p. 245 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961), reserved explicitly to the States by
the Tenth Amendment.”).
39. See BORDELON, supra note 13, at 129.
40. Id.
41. Pub. L. 103-159 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921, 922).
42. Printz, 521 U.S. at 902.
43. Id. at 903.
44. Id. at 905 (“Petitioners here object to being pressed into federal service,
and contend that congressional action compelling state officers to execute federal
laws is unconstitutional.”).
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reached the Supreme Court, after the District Courts45 declared the
provision unconstitutional and the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding no
constitutional discrepancies.46
The five-justice majority of the Supreme Court held the interim
background-check provision unconstitutional due to the anticommandeering doctrine. 47 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,
states early in the opinion that “[f]rom the description set forth above,
it is apparent that the Brady Act purports to direct state law
enforcement officers to participate, albeit only temporarily, in the
administration of a federally enacted regulatory scheme.”48 The Court
imported the anti-commandeering principle used in New York,
protecting the freedom of state legislators, applying it to state
executive officers.49 The Court summarized the anti-commandeering
doctrine with new rigidity by stating that, “It matters not whether
policymaking is involved, and no case-by-case weighing of the
burdens or benefits is necessary; such commands are fundamentally
incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty.”50
Regardless of the governmental branch that is directed to act, if
Congress purports to issue orders directly to state actors the legislation
is constitutionally invalid under the anti-commandeering doctrine.
B. History of Sports Gambling in the United States
To understand the policy effects of sports gambling, it is crucial
to expound on its regulatory history in the United States. The
American public and its politicians have had a cyclical relationship
with sports gambling; decades of acceptance have consistently been

45. Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Mont. 1994), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, dismissed in part sub nom. Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025 (9th
Cir. 1995), rev’d sub nom. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Mack v.
United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Ariz. 1994), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
dismissed in part, 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1995), rev’d sub nom. Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
46. Mack, 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom. Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
47. Printz, 521 U.S. at 933.
48. Id. at 904.
49. See BORDELON, supra note 13 at 133 (explaining that the Court was
hesitant to distinguish cases on such a fine line between legislative and executive
action).
50. Printz, 521 U.S. at 935.
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followed by stages of strong regulatory legislation.51 Understanding
these cycles is an important step in the analysis of PASPA and related
litigation. They simultaneously illuminate both the detrimental sideeffects and the tax incentives of sports gambling in the government
context.
1. 18th Century: Gambling-Funded Revolution
Gambling has been a part of American culture since its genesis.52
In fact, all thirteen original colonies, many historical American
universities, and even the Revolutionary War were funded by
gambling. 53 In addition to engaging in general lotteries, early
Americans bet on “pedestrianism,” a race-walking sport that was
imported from England, and also “horse races, cockfights, and bareknuckle brawls” for entertainment purposes. 54 Following these
origins, gambling was gradually abandoned throughout the 19th
Century as the federal and state governments developed more efficient
taxation systems.55
51. See Justin Fielkow, Daniel Werly & Andrew Sensi, Tackling PASPA: The
Past, Present, and Future of Sports Gambling in America, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 23,
25 (2016) (“The United States has had a complicated on-again, off-again
relationship with gambling throughout its history.”); Brett Smiley, A History of
Sports Betting in the United States: Gambling Laws and Outlaws, SPORTS HANDLE
(Nov. 13, 2017), https://sportshandle.com/gambling-laws-legislation-united-stateshistory/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2019) (“[T]he U.S. has witnessed a long tug-of-war
between gambling laws, and people who want to enjoy gambling in various forms,
including sports betting.”).
52. Ronald J. Rychlak, Lotteries, Revenues and Social Costs: A Historical
Examination of State-Sponsored Gambling, 34 B.C.L. REV. 11, 12 (1992) (“Two
hundred years ago, government-sanctioned lotteries were common throughout
America. Lacking a strong central government and burdened with a weak tax base,
early Americans viewed lotteries as legitimate vehicles for raising revenue. Lottery
proceeds were used to build cities, establish universities, and even to help finance
the Revolutionary War.”).
53. See Smiley, supra note 51.
54. See Jeremy Martin, History of Sports Betting and the Point Spread, DOC’S
SPORTS SERV (May 30, 2017), https://www.docsports.com/sports-bettinghistory.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2019) (discussing early American sports
gambling); See also generally Allen Moody, History of Sports Betting,
THOUGHTCO, https://www.thoughtco.com/history-of- betting-3116857 (May 2,
2017) (outlining the general history of global and American sports gambling).
55. Rychlak, supra note 54, at 12. See also A.R. Spofford, LOTTERIES IN
AMERICAN HISTORY, S. Misc. Doc. No. 57, 52d Cong., 2d Sess. 195
(1893) (Annual Report of the American Historical Society) (the Librarian of
Congress wrote of “a general public conviction that lotteries are to be regarded, in

Fall 2019]

Shannon

11

2. 20th Century: Sports Gambling Scandals and Regulation
Even as the United States turned away from lotteries, Americans
shifted their focus towards sports gambling. The country was full of
organized gambling houses that provided guests the chance to gamble
on typical casino games, but also organized sporting events. 56 This
popularity, combined with little to no regulation, led to numerous
sports gambling scandals, including: the 1919 Chicago Black Sox
World Series scandal,57 a college basketball scandal in the 1950s,58
and years, later the famous Pete Rose betting scandal in the late
1980s.59 These scandals not only highlighted the immense popularity
of gambling on sports, but also the need to regulate it for the integrity
of the games.60 The federal government, in a constant battle between
potential revenue and the negative social effects of sports gambling,
eventually shifted back towards stricter regulation following these
athlete scandals.61
Reacting to the fear of organized crime, Congress enacted
numerous statutes to put a stop to sports gambling rings.62 In 1961,

direct proportion to their extension, as among the most dangerous and prolific
sources of human misery”).
56. See COMM’NON THE REV. OF THE NAT’L. POL’Y TOWARD GAMBLING,
GAMBLING
IN
AMERICA
169
(1976),
(1976)
https://ia802205.us.archive.org/4/items/gamblinginameric00unit/gamblinginameri
c00unit.pdf (noting that by 1850 there were over six thousand gambling houses in
New York City alone, which equates to one gambling house for every eighty-five
residents of the city).
57. Evan Andrews, The Black Sox Baseball Scandal, HISTORY (Oct. 9, 2014),
https://www.history.com/news/the-black-sox-baseball-scandal-95-years-ago (last
visited Sept. 13, 2019).
58. See Chil Woo, All Bets Are off: Revisiting the Professional and Amateur
Sports Protection Act (PASPA), 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 569, 573 (2013).
59. See Jeff Merron, Biggest Sports Gambling Scandals, ESPN (Feb. 7, 2006),
http://www.espn.com/espn/page2/story?page=merron/060207 (last visited Sept. 13,
2019).
60. See Fieklow, et al., supra note 51, at 27 (stating sports gambling legislation
was rooted in strong negative public perceptions that developed following player
scandals and the rise of organized crime).
61. See Rychlak, Rychlak supra note 52, at 13–14 (“Throughout history,
governments have been torn between a desire to tap gambling’s enormous potential
as a source of revenue and a fear of its associated social ills.”).
62. Fielklow et al., supra note 51, at 27.
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three of these laws were passed including the Federal Wire Act,63 the
Travel Act of 1961, 64 and the Interstate Transportation of
Paraphernalia Act of 1961.65 The main purpose of these laws was to
hinder the influence of organized crime on sports. 66 Additionally,
Congress passed the Sports Bribery Act of 1964 67 and the Illegal
Gambling and Business Act.68 Historically, Native American tribes
have been given more freedom to operate gaming operations, but in
1988 Congress passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act that
provided more regulation of typical casino games.69 Despite these stiff
63. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1961) (“Whoever being engaged in the business of
betting or wagering knowingly uses a wire communication facility for the
transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information
assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the
transmission of a wire communication which entitles the recipient to receive money
or credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for information assisting in the placing of
bets or wagers, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years,
or both.”).
64. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1961) (“(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign
commerce or uses the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, with
intent to—
(1) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity”).
65. 18 U.S.C. § 1953 (1961) (“Whoever, except a common carrier in the usual
course of its business, knowingly carries or sends in interstate or foreign commerce
any record, paraphernalia, ticket, certificate, bills, slip, token, paper, writing, or
other device used, or to be used, or adapted, devised, or designed for use in (a)
bookmaking; or (b) wagering pools with respect to a sporting event; or (c) in a
numbers, policy, bolita, or similar game shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
for not more than five years or both.”).
66. Att’y Gen. Robert F. Kennedy, In Support of Legislation to Curb
Organized
Crime
and
Racketeering
18
(May
17,
1961),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/01/20/05-17-1961.pdf
(“[T]he federal government is not undertaking the almost impossible task of dealing
with all the many forms of casual or social wagering which so often may be effected
over communication facilities. It is not intended that the [Wire Act] should prevent
a social wager between friends by telephone. This legislation can be a most effective
weapon in dealing with one of the major factors of organized crime in this country
without invading the privacy of the home or outraging the sensibilities of our people
in matters of personal inclination and morals.”).
67. 18 U.S.C.A. § 224 (1964) (“Whoever carries into effect, attempts to carry
into effect, or conspires with any other person to carry into effect any scheme in
commerce to influence, in any way, by bribery any sporting contest, with knowledge
that the purpose of such scheme is to influence by bribery that contest, shall be fined
under this title, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.”).
68. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1970) (“Whoever conducts, finances, manages,
supervises, directs, or owns all or part of an illegal gambling business shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”).
69. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1988).
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regulations, illegal sports gambling continued and even proliferated.70
In 1976, the Commission on the Review of the National Policy
Toward Gambling reported that over two-thirds of the country
gambled and over 80% of the population approved of that practice.71
The Commission recommended, and Congress agreed, that the
regulation of gambling be de-prioritized in politics. 72 In the end
though, the Commission and Congress decided to maintain the thencurrent state prohibitions on sports gambling.73
3. 21st Century: More Regulation, Divided Opinions
At the turn of the century, professional sports leagues waged a war
on sports gambling.74 Sports leaders admitted that “sports gambling
threatens the character of team sports.”75 Their worries proved right
in 2007 when there was yet another sports gambling scandal, as an
NBA referee was charged with intentionally influencing the outcomes
of games for gambling profit.76 Congress once again passed another
law, the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act,77 to curb the
booming internet gambling business and put more of a burden on
banks to block illegal gambling transactions.78 The cyclical nature of
sports gambling opinions once again led to softened stances on its
70. See Smiley, supra note 51.
71. COMM’N ON THE REV. OF THE NAT’L. POL’Y TOWARD GAMBLING, supra
note 56, at ix.
72. See Fielklow et al., supra note 51, at 28; see also COMM’N ON THE REV. OF
THE NAT’L. POL’Y TOWARD GAMBLING, supra note 56, at 1 (“Gambling is
inevitable. No matter what is said or done by advocates or opponents of gambling
in all its various forms, it is an activity that is practiced, or tacitly endorsed, by a
substantial majority of Americans.”).
73. Id. (explaining that lifting the sports gambling bans would be unwise
because it would provide very little state revenue and current tax policies prevent
potential state-run systems from being able to compete with organized crime rings).
74. S. REP. NO. 102-248 at 4 (1991)[hereinafter Senate Report] (“Sports
gambling threatens the character of team sports. Our games embody our very finest
traditions and values. They stand for clean, healthy competition. They stand for
teamwork. And they stand for success through preparation and honest effort. With
legalized sports gambling, our games instead will come to represent the fast buck,
the quick fix, the desire to get something for nothing. The spread of legalized sports
gambling would change forever—and for the worse—what our games stand for and
the way they are perceived”.) (quoting then -NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue).
75. Id.
76. Donaghy Under Investigation for Betting on NBA Games, ESPN (July 20,
2007), http://www.espn.com/nba/news/story?id=2943095.
77. 31 U.S.C. § 5362 (2006).
78. See Smiley, supra note 51.
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legality. Immediately preceding Murphy v. National Collegiate
Athletic Association, an increase in technological capabilities coupled
with sports commissioners79 pushing for its legality created a strong
push for both legalized gambling and judicial protection of state
independence from federal government overreach.
4. PASPA and Sports Gambling
As noted, the history of sports gambling is riddled with peaks and
valleys of regulation. 80 The Professional and Amateur Sports
Protection Act (“PASPA”) was enacted by Congress in 1992 as part
of an upswing on sports gambling regulation. In this section PASPA
and its litigation history will be outlined to better understand the
context of the Supreme Court decision in Murphy v. National
Collegiate Athletic Association.
On February 22, 1991, Senate Bill 474 was introduced with
bipartisan support. 81 Then- Senator Joe Biden declared that the
legislation was necessary because, otherwise, sports gambling would
spread state by state and develop “irreversible momentum,”
threatening the integrity of organized sports and harming youth. 82
With 13 states closing in on legalizing their own state-sponsored
gambling laws, the major sports commissioners and the majority of
Congressmen and women united in favor of PASPA.83 Senator Chuck
79. See generally American Attitudes on Sports Betting Have Changed, AM.
SPORTS
BETTING
COALITION
(2017),
http://www.sportsbettinginamerica.com/about/ (mentioning the change in
perceptions of NFL commissioner Roger Goodell, NBA commissioner Adam
Silver, former NBA commissioner David Stern, MLB commissioner Rob Manfred,
and NHL commission Gary Bettman).
80. See Fielkow et al., supra note 51, at 25.
81. Senate Report, supra note 74, at 3.
82. Id. at 5; see also Fielklow et al., supra note 51, at 30 (“At the time, the
primary arguments in favor of PASPA were (1) protecting the integrity, and
preserving the character, of sports; (2) shielding America’s impressionable youth
from vice; and (3) restricting any further spreading of state-authorized sports
gambling.”) (citing Prohibiting State-Sanctioned Sports Gambling: Hearing on S.
473 and S. 474 Before the Subcomm. On Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the
S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1992)).
83. See 138 CONG. REC. 32439 (1992) (statement of Rep. Hamilton Fish, Jr.,
Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“If a large number of States and localities
make betting on sports a public institution, they are really incorporating it into the
fabric of public policy and implicitly giving it the stamp of an official sanction.”);
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act: Hearing on H.R. 74 Before the
Subcomm. on Economics and Commercial Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
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Grassley, one of the few opponents of PASPA, with a keen eye to
future litigation argued that the statute would directly impede state
freedom, which in turn would lead to future Constitutional
challenges. 84 The Department of Justice raised similar concerns of
Congressional overreach of state freedoms.85 Despite these legitimate
apprehensions, PASPA was signed into law on October 28, 1992 by
President George H.W. Bush.86
PASPA contains both a “grandfather” provision that allows the
city of Las Vegas and other established gambling areas to maintain
their sports gambling business87 and a provision stating that Atlantic
City, New Jersey can establish legalized gambling if it does so within
one year of the law’s effective date.88 New Jersey decided to forgo
this option; instead, its citizens voted to amend the State Constitution
years later to make it lawful for the state legislature to authorize sports
gambling.89 Following this vote, the New Jersey legislature used the
amendment to pass the “Sports Wagering Law” that legalized sports
gambling statewide.90
New Jersey’s state legislation immediately came under attack
from professional sports leagues and the NCAA. The NCAA brought
suit against New Jersey Governor Chris Christie in federal court

102d Cong., 1st Sess. 26, 52 (1991) (“There will be millions of additional
Americans induced and seduced into gambling if this growth industry is permitted
to take the imprimatur of the State and support State-sanctioned point-spread
betting.”) (statement of NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue).
84. Senate Report, supra note 74, at 12.
85. Id. (arguing that there are additional issues with PASPA including: (1) the
Grandfather Clause which allowed certain states such as Delaware and Nevada to
continue allowing legalized sports gambling, (2) the fact that illegal gambling rings
would now have a monopoly on the billion dollar industry, and (3) that federal
intrusion into state decision making would interfere with state revenue in this case).
86. Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-559, 106
Stat. 4227 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3704 (2012)).
87. Id. §§ 3704(a)(1)-(2) (2012).
88. Id. § 3704(a)(3) (2012).
89. N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, ¶ 2 (2012).
90. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12A-1 to 5:12A-6 (2012), invalidated by Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013);
see also N.J. Moves Towards Legal Sports Betting This Fall, in Time for NFL
Season,
NATIONAL
LAW
REVIEW
(May
25,
2012),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/nj-moves-towards-legal-sports-betting-falltime-nfl-season (“We intend to go forward and allow sports gambling to happen, if
someone wants to stop us, they’ll have to take action to stop us.”) (quoting Governor
Chris Christie).
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claiming that the new law violated PASPA.91 New Jersey responded
by claiming that “PASPA unconstitutionally infringed the State’s
sovereign authority to end its sports gambling ban.” 92 The District
Court found no violation,93 and the Third Circuit affirmed because
PASPA does not impose any affirmative action upon the states.94 The
Supreme Court denied review in 2013 because PASPA did not
prohibit New Jersey from removing previously enacted gambling
prohibitions. 95 In its brief opposing certiorari, the United States
admitted that PASPA does not force New Jersey to maintain
legislation enacted prior to PASPA and it could repeal these
prohibitions. In 2014, New Jersey enacted and framed a new sports
gambling statute as a “repealer” statute that repealed its previous
sports gambling prohibition. 96 The NCAA once again filed suit in
federal court.97 The District Court ruled in favor of the NCAA98 and
the Third Circuit affirmed.99 The Third Circuit did not accept New
Jersey’s “artful” attempt at making the law a repeal statute, instead
holding that the law indeed violates PASPA.100 In 2017, the Supreme
Court finally granted review to settle the crucial constitutional
question that arose in the preceding litigation.

91. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n. v. Christie, 926 F.Supp.2d 551 (D.N.J.
2013).
92. Murphy, 138 S.Ct. at 1471.
93. Christie, 926 F.Supp.2d at 573.
94. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n. v. Christie, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013).
95. Murphy, 138 S.Ct. at 1472.
96. Id.
97. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n. v. Christie, 61 F.Supp.3d 488 (D.N.J.
2014).
98. Id. at 508.
99. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Governor of N.J., 832 F.3d 389 (3d Cir.
2016).
100. Id. at 401 (explaining that the 2014 law “selectively remove[s] a
prohibition on sports wagering in a manner that permissively channels wagering
activity to particular locations or operators”).
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ANALYSIS: ANTI-COMMANDEERING DOCTRINE AND THE
LIBERTY OF VULNERABLE POPULATIONS

A. Section 3702 of PASPA Ruled Unconstitutional Due to AntiCommandeering Doctrine
In 2018, the Supreme Court once again employed the anticommandeering doctrine, this time to strike § 3702 of PASPA.101 The
court lays out three arguments in favor of the anti-commandeering
doctrine: structural protections of liberty, political accountability, and
its prevention of Congress shifting the costs of regulation onto the
States.102 Although the principles were reasonable, the Supreme Court
missed the mark when it failed to defer to legislature because its strict
adherence to the anti-commandeering doctrine undervalues the
negative effects the policy has on state sovereignty and its benefits.
This section evaluates the Supreme Court’s arguments and analyzes
the competing policy interests that should have held more weight
during the Court’s anti-commandeering analysis.
The most crucial argument that the majority employed is that the
doctrine protects individual liberty. The argument was that the
protection of state sovereignty is not for the benefit of the states, but
rather for the benefit of the individual. 103 As stated in Printz and
quoted in Murphy, a “healthy balance of power between the States and
the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse
from either front.”104 But, the balance between individual liberty and
congressional oversight is delicate. Government has the responsibility
to protect its citizens while sports gambling has addictive qualities that
not only hurts individuals, but also extends to the families, sports
leagues and communities.105 The anti-commandeering doctrine needs
101. Murphy, 138 S.Ct. at 1478 (“The PASPA provision at issue here—
prohibiting state authorization of sports gambling—violates the anticommandeering
rule.”).
102. Id. at 1477.
103. Id. (“[T]he constitution divides authority between federal and state
governments for the protection of the individuals.”) (citing New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992)) (emphasis added).
104. Printz, 521 U.S. at 921 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458
(1991)).
105. Contra Barney Frank, With Gambling, Personal Freedom is Always the
Best Bet, Says Barney Frank, US NEWS (June 1, 2009, 2:08 PM),
https://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2009/06/01/with-gambling-personalfreedom-is-always-the-best-bet-says-barney-frank (“There are people who believe
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to better balance current sports gambling laws with individual
freedoms.
Second, the majority argued that the anti-commandeering doctrine
fosters political accountability. The reasoning is that when states are
forced to impose certain regulations promulgated by Congress, the
responsibility for said political actions are “blurred.” 106 Individuals
that wish to debate or change the regulation would not know who to
go to or who to vote against in order to achieve their goal. In the case
at hand, this argument bears little weight because PASPA does not
actually force states to carry out any action. 107 The anticommandeering analysis needs to take into account this distinction
even though the Supreme Court rejected it in Murphy. 108 Citizens
would know which lawmakers to hold accountable because Congress
is the only political body taking action which is not a violation of
federalism principles.
Lastly, the Court argued that the principle prevents Congress from
shifting the cost of regulation onto state governments. Yet, if Congress
were to pass a law forcing state governments to enforce a policy, then
the federal government does not need to weigh the expected costs and
benefits of the program because it has no effect on the federal
government.109 This bears no weight on the analysis though because
that it is appropriate to use the law to impose on others personal, religious, or moral
tenets, whether or not they deal with behavior that impinges on others. Obviously,
society has an obligation to enforce those aspects of morality that protect people
from others. Murder, robbery, fraud, and arson, for example, should be harshly
prosecuted. But personal behavior that harms no one ought to be within the sphere
of personal autonomy.”).
106. Murphy, 138 S.Ct. at 1477.
107. Brief for Respondents at 59, Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,
137 S.Ct. 2327 (2017) (Nos. 16-476, 16-477), 2017 WL 4684747, at *59 (“In full
compliance with the anti-commandeering doctrine, Congress effectuated its intent
without resorting to anything like the affirmative commands that doomed the
statutory provisions at issue in New York and Printz.”).
108. Murphy, 138 S.Ct. at 1478 (“It was a matter of happenstance that the laws
challenged in New York and Printz commanded ‘affirmative’ action as opposed to
imposing a prohibition. The basic principle—that Congress cannot issue direct
orders to state legislatures—applies in either event.”); see also id. at 1489
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the non-commandeering aspects of PASPA
are severable from the unconstitutional aspects).
109. Id. at 1477; see also Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism,
46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1360 (2001) (“If our system of political checks is to rest on
a foundation of popular loyalty, the people need to know when to get upset and at
whom. The system requires a certain degree of transparency. It must be clear when
the national government has acted, as opposed to the states, so that the people can
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once again PASPA does not force states to take action. It simply
prevents them from sponsoring sports gambling. The Supreme Court
did not believe in this distinction, but it does prevent the cost shifting
that anti-commandeering principles are meant to protect against.
B. Psychology of Gambling and its Effect on Vulnerable
An unrefined and expansive anti-commandeering doctrine allows
for tangible negative effects on vulnerable populations. There is a
direct link between gambling and loss of liberty. If there is legalized,
accessible sports gambling, certain vulnerable populations will have
their personal liberty disproportionately limited based on addiction.
This section highlights the psychological effects of gambling and its
severe impact on susceptible groups. It creates a foundation to argue
that these policy concerns outweigh the constitutional concerns of the
Supreme Court.
1. Sports Gambling Psychology and the Loss of Liberty
Numerous scientific studies suggest that sports gambling is
intimately connected to addiction. If states allow sports gambling,
inequality will increase based on it taking the liberty away from
individuals, families and communities alike. In May 2013, the
American Psychiatric Association officially classified pathological
gambling as an addiction rather than an impulse-control disorder.110
This crucial distinction shifted gambling within the scientific
community from a personal choice issue to an illness-oriented
approach. This decision was based on neuroscience studies that
proved that gambling and drug addictions are far more connected than
previous research indicated.111
Additionally, inequality plays a causal role in risk-taking
behavior.112 The largest number of gamblers come from the poorest
provide feedback to the political process that resulted in the action. Without
transparency and accountability, political safeguards do not have the necessary
information to operate.”).
110. See Ferris Jabr, The Science of Health: Gambling on the Brain, 309(5) SCI.
AM. 28–30 (Nov. 2013).
111. Id. (explaining current neuroscience research in order to compare the
release of dopamine within the brain “reward system” for addictive gambling and
drug addiction).
112. “Inequality” refers to vulnerable populations. See Sandeep Mishra, Leanne
S. Son Hing & Martin L. Lalumiére, Inequality and Risk-Taking, 13(3)
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segments of the population, as gambling is viewed as a vehicle out of
poverty. 113 Gambling creates a perceived opportunity for social
mobility and a relief from the anxieties and stressors of being poor.114
Gambling can become a form of “economic predation” 115 as
vulnerable populations can be exploited in order to create revenue for
casinos, sports leagues, or even state governments. This vicious
incentive cycle will create perverse incentives to increase gambling
availability which in turn will lead to more addiction and poverty
within society. The federal government has the ability to create laws
that prevent the use of certain drugs in order to protect society from
the various negative impacts of the use of these drug (i.e. addiction,
crime, etc.). The anti-commandeering doctrine is a valid federalism
principle, but it should not prevent Congress from acting on the need
to regulate sports gambling. Just as drugs are regulated due to their
addictive qualities, the federal government should be allowed to
regulate sports gambling without a rigid interpretation of anticommandeering doctrine getting in the way.
2. Impact on Vulnerable Populations
Beyond the poor, legalized state-sponsored sports gambling
would disproportionately affect other vulnerable populations
including teenagers and young adults, chemically-dependent
individuals, and the Native American population. First, in Italy, where
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOL. 1–11, at 9 (2015) (“The effect of inequality on risktaking manifested in short time frames, suggesting that inequality is a salient
motivator of risk-taking to which people are acutely sensitive. In everyday
situations, it is possible that victims of inequality would experience persistent
feedback emphasizing such inequalities (e.g., repeated group-based discrimination,
stigmatization of the poor), potentially leading to even greater elevation of risktaking. . . . This study has important policy implications: Aiming to affect
modifiable circumstances that motivate risk-taking, such as inequality in access to
health care, education, wealth, and other opportunities, may lead to significant
reductions in risky behavior.”).
113. Monica Straniero, How Gambling Contributes to Inequality, VITA INT’L
(Apr. 13, 2016), http://www.vitainternational.media/en/article/2016/04/13/howgambling-contributes-to-inequality/325/ (“[P]oor man’s stock exchange”).
114. See Bol, supra note 4, at 65.
115. See Straniero, supra note 113 (“One thing is for sure: Gambling is a form
of economic predation. Today, amid massive budget shortfalls, politicians are
scrambling to find new sources of revenue in the hope to solve their economic
issues. But while the reality of doing so is far from beneficial, the effects of the
expansion of gambling on low-income and disadvantaged individuals have failed to
receive adequate consideration.”) (emphasis added).
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there are notoriously weak gambling laws, a research study shows that
youth are especially at risk of becoming addicted to gambling and
even more so for youth in the lower economic segments of the
population because of their lack of social support from parents and
teachers. 116 Additionally, young people have more technological
skills and interest in sports which makes sports gambling more
attractive and accessible.117 Second, as mentioned earlier, alcoholism,
drug-abuse and problem gambling share many diagnostic features and
often times affect the same individuals. 118 Third, Native American
populations have traditionally been given control of gambling markets
without state regulation. This is a form of reparation on the part of the
United States government for the previous mistreatment of Native
Americans. 119 If state-sponsored sports gambling was legalized, it
would significantly cut into the gambling revenue of Native American
tribes. All of these groups, which the Supreme Court should strive to
protect, will be negatively affected by the Murphy decision. These
groups deserve to be protected and not forgotten due to strict
adherence to federalism principles. Simply put, state-sponsored sports
gambling will harm these specific groups by leading to both decreased
liberty and increased inequality.
C. Perverse State Budgetary Incentives
Every year state legislators scramble to balance the state
government’s budget. They debate tax structures and revenue models
116. See Canale, supra note 5, at 3 (“Indeed, the lack of social support might
exacerbate the impact of income inequality on adolescent problem gambling. Thus,
the present study intended to clarify the additive role of social support and macrolevel factors related to adolescent gambling severity.”).
117. See Carmen Messerlian, et al., Gambling, Youth and the Internet: Should
We Be Concerned?, 13 THE CANADIAN CHILD AND ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY REV.
3, 5 (Feb. 2004) (“Governments, the industry and the public have a responsibility to
protect youth from potentially harmful products and activities. Public policy should
reflect the changing social climate and aim to protect youth from access to gambling
products and exposure to gambling promotion.”); see also John Warren Kindt &
Thomas Asmar, College and Amateur Sports Gambling: Gambling Away Our
Youth?, 8 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 221 (2002).
118. Justin D. Wareham & Marc N. Potenza, Pathological Gambling and
Substance Use Disorders, 36(5) AM. J. DRUG ALCOHOL ABUSE 242–47 (2010).
119. See generally Eric S. Lent, Are States Beating the House?: The Validity of
Tribal-State Revenue Sharing Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 91 GEO.
L.J. 451, 453–54 (2003) (Outlining the decision in California v. Cabazon Band of
Mission Indians, Native American gaming legislation (Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act), and the history of Native American gaming).
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to eventually compromise on a balanced budget. Due to the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Murphy, state legislators can now legalize sports
gambling in order to boost revenue. This creates a perverse incentive
for states to legalize sports gambling which preys on the
vulnerabilities in society in order to create revenue to assist in
balancing the state’s budget. This section will summarize the key
difference between state and federal budgets and discuss sports
gambling revenue projects to assert that states are incentivized to
legalize sports gambling which in turn disproportionately taxes
vulnerable populations.
1. State Budgets vs. Federal Budgets
On its face it may appear that gambling revenue is new wealth, but
in reality it is just current wealth being redistributed unequally.120 The
issue created by the Murphy decision is that states can now create their
own gambling schemes to collect “voluntary taxes”121 from gamblers
in order to balance their budgets. State budgets are mandated to be
balanced every year, whereas the Federal Government can run a
deficit and borrow money to meet its financial obligations.122 This key
budgetary difference means that state legislatures have the perverse
incentive, balancing budget over protecting vulnerable citizens, to
legalize sports gambling. It may appear as if individuals are simply
using their individual liberty to participate in this “voluntary tax,” but
it is not as simple as new tax revenue being collected from citizens.
This scheme unequally redistributes wealth from society’s poorest to
the government. State legislatures know about the negative health and
policy effects of gambling on vulnerable populations but are still
incentivized to collect the vast revenues created by sports gambling to
meet the requirement of a balanced budget.123 Congress, and in turn
the courts, must be able to circumvent valid federalism principles in
order to protect society from these perverse incentives associated with
state-sponsored gambling schemes.
120. See Straniero, supra note 113 (“gambling produces no new wealth, only
redistribution of currency on an inequitable basis.”).
121. Id.
122. The Difference Between Federal, State and Local Governments’ Budgets,
GOVSPEND,
https://www.govspend.com/2017/11/14/the-difference-betweenfederal-state-and-local-governments-budgets/.
123. Straniero, supra note 113 (“Raising more revenues using voluntary taxes
is politically easier than cutting spending, (benefits), or raising income taxes,
property taxes, general sales taxes, or other unpopular taxes.”).
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2. Sports Gambling Effect on State Revenue
There are currently eight states that have legalized sports
gambling and twenty-three states with proposed sports gambling
legislation.124 In its first year of legalized gambling, Pennsylvania has
brought in $385 million dollars from primarily up front licensing fees
as well as from online casino, sportsbooks, mini-casino auction profits
and tax revenue from lottery expansion and daily fantasy sports.125
Similarly, New Jersey has also had explosive growth since statesponsored sports gambling was legalized.126 Examining the data from
this early-adopting state makes two things clear: (1) there is a lot of
money to be made, and (2) the market is continually growing.
Month

Total Wagered

June 2018

$16.4 million

Total
Revenue
$3.5 million

July 2018

$40.7 million

$3.8 million

August 2018

$95.6 million

$9.2 million

September 2018

$184 million

$23.9 million

October 2018

$260.7 million

$11.7 million

November 2018

$330 million

$21.2 million

Many economic analysts believe that legalized sports gambling
will have a limited impact on fixing state budget problems.127 Sports
124. Ryan Rodenberg, United States of Sports Betting: An Updated Map of
Where
Every
State
Stands,
ESPN
(Aug.
2,
2019),
http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/19740480/gambling-sports-betting-billtracker-all-50-states.
125. Chris Murphy, Gambling Fills the Gaps in Pennsylvania State Budget,
SBC AMERICA (Dec. 10, 2018), https://sbcamericas.com/2018/12/10/gamblingfills-the-gaps-in-pennsylvania-state-budget/.
126. Sports
Betting
Revenue
2019,
THE
LINES,
https://www.thelines.com/betting/revenue/.
127. Paul Davidson, Supreme Court Sports Betting Decision is Unlikely to Fix
State
Budget
Problems,
USA
TODAY
(May
14,
2018),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2018/05/14/supreme-court-sports-bettingruling-unlikely-relieve-budget-crises/609317002/ (“A study last year by Oxford
Economics for the American Gaming Association found that legalizing sports
betting would generate $3.4 billion in state and local tax revenue across the country.
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gambling only makes up a small fraction of traditional casino earnings
and an even smaller proportion of what would be taxed if it were a
private enterprise.128 This skepticism of the workability of balancing
a budget via gambling revenue does not mean that state governments
will not be incentivized to collect revenue by the millions from
gambling citizens. Although the revenue may only cover a small
fraction of the total budget, states will continue to have economic
incentive to legalize sports gambling.
D. Potential Judicial Solutions to Balance Federalism Concerns
and Policy
The Murphy decision highlights the need for a reasonable solution
to prevent Federalism concerns from mitigating Congressional policy
interests. Opening up the floodgates of legalized sports gambling
allows state legislatures to prey on vulnerable groups. The only thing
preventing Congress from enacting PASPA is the judicial backlash
based on the anti-commandeering doctrine. This section analyzes
various judicial solutions, including the avoidance doctrine, the
severability doctrine, the necessary and proper clause, and the
commerce clause. These judicial solutions will allow courts to
circumvent the anti-commandeering doctrine when interpreting
statutes to protect these vulnerable groups without overstepping state
sovereignty.
1. Constitutional Avoidance Doctrine
The avoidance canon seeks to balance the protection of
constitutional rules while also showing respect for the actions of
elected officials129 by presuming that Congress intends to enact laws
that are constitutional.130 While interpreting a statute and analyzing its
validity, a court “will first ascertain whether a construction of the
statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”131 In
But that would still represent just about 0.3% of all state and local government
revenue, excluding federal funding.”).
128. Id.; see also Michelle Minton, Congress Already Ruined Sports Betting
Once; Don’t Let Them Do It Again, WASHINGTON EXAMINER (Oct. 1, 2018),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/op-eds/congress-already-ruinedsports-betting-once-dont-let-them-do-it-again.
129. Gunnar P. Seaquist, The Constitutional Avoidance Canon of Statutory
Construction, 71 THE ADVOC. (TEXAS) 25, 25 (2015).
130. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 148 (2000).
131. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936).

Fall 2019]

Shannon

25

recent jurisprudence courts have been less willing to strike down
statutes if they can be construed to avoid constitutional difficulty.132
The respondents in Murphy made the argument that the courts had
over-expanded the term “authorize” which violated the avoidance
doctrine. 133 The Supreme Court reasoned that even the alternate
interpretation of “authorize,” that it did not force state legislatures to
carry out any specific action, made the statute a violation of the anticommandeering doctrine. 134 Even though the Court rejected the
respondent’s argument, they did admit that Congress could regulate
sports gambling directly. 135 It could have been argued that an
alternative reading of PASPA shows that Congress was planning to
regulate sports gambling directly, rather than forcing the states to act.
In future anti-commandeering doctrine cases litigants could employ
this strategy and use the doctrine in order to avoid the constitutional
problem and presumably get closer to the intent of the legislature. In
the vast majority of cases, Congress is not trying to overstep the
freedom of states, and this doctrine will allow courts to let their
opinions follow this assumption. Avoidance doctrine may be useful to
avoid striking statutes due to anti-commandeering decisions.
2. Severability Doctrine
The severability doctrine, the main interpretive tool the dissent
argues for in Murphy, allows courts to cut out any unconstitutional
sections of a statute and leave the remaining statutory provisions
intact.136 The court must decide if the legislature would have intended
132. Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern
Supreme Court and Legal Change, HARV. L. REV. 2109, 2111 (2015) (“The canon
has thus in practice morphed into a twisted corollary: a court should not strike down
a law if it can be judicially rewritten to avoid constitutional difficulty. We call this
move the ‘rewriting power.’ … [T]he rewriting power…we call active avoidance—
using the avoidance canon to usher in legal change.”).
133. Brief for Respondents, supra note 107 at 38 (“Courts are supposed to read
statutes to avoid constitutional difficulties, not to create them.”). The Respondents
believed that the Court expanded “authorize” to entail commandeering when they
could have interpreted the word more simply to avoid the Constitutional difficulty.
134. Murphy, 138 S.Ct. at 1475 (“The plausibility of the alternative
interpretations is debatable, but even if the law could be interpreted as respondents
and the United States suggest, it would still violate the anticommandeering
principle. . . .”).
135. Id. at 1484–85 (“Congress can regulate sports gambling directly, but if it
elects not to do so, each State is free to act on its own.”).
136. See David H. Gans, Severability as Judicial Lawmaking, 76 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 639, 639 (2008).
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the valid remaining sections to stand on their own after striking
another part of the statute for being unconstitutional.137 The Supreme
Court in Murphy decided that the Congress that enacted PASPA
would likely not want to sever the rest of the statute from §3702(1).138
Although the Court has reasoned analysis, §3702(2) could hold its
own if §3702(1) was removed from the statute. This would simply
prevent private citizens from operating sports gambling businesses
without commandeering state authority. If this severability analysis
was accepted by the courts and sports gambling was legalized in
certain states, it would mirror the current issue regarding marijuana
legislation. Private actors who operate a sports gambling business
would be following state laws but be in violation of federal law. In
short, this severability solution is an incomplete means to protect
federal law from anti-commandeering principles.
3. Necessary and Proper Clause and the Commerce Clause
Under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, Congress has the
power "to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or
any Department or Officer thereof.”139 Additionally, the Commerce
Clause states that Congress shall have the power “to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes.” 140 The post-New Deal courts enlarged
Congressional power by employing both of these Constitutional

137. Id. at 645 (“[A] court should refrain from invalidating more of the statute
than is necessary. . . . [W]henever an act of Congress contains unobjectionable
provisions separable from those found to be unconstitutional, it is the duty of this
court to so declare, and to maintain the act in so far as it is valid.”) (quoting Alaska
Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 683 (1987)); see also Ayotte v. Planned
Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S.320, 329 (2006) (“[W]e try not to nullify
more of a legislature’s work than is necessary, for we know that ‘[a] ruling of
unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the elected representatives of the
people.’”).
138. Murphy, 138 S.Ct. at 1483 (explaining that Congress intended the
provisions in §3702(1) and §3702(2) to work together in suing the state that
authorized and private entity that owned the gambling operation).
139. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
140. Id.
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principles. The courts upheld various federal statutes as necessary and
proper means to achieve legitimate commerce regulation.141
It is not disputed that Congress may employ the commerce power
in order to regulate gambling nationwide. 142 The specific
commandeering issues within PASPA takes more critical analysis. A
large amount of sports gambling takes place on the internet, with large
sums of money crossing borders.143 The respondents in Murphy could
have argued that because of these statistics and the fact that the sports
franchises are located in different states, sports gambling qualifies as
interstate commerce. Next, they would argue that because of the
harmful effects of gambling, much like illegal drugs, it is necessary
and proper for Congress to control this interstate commerce. This
constitutional backdoor argument is slightly attenuated but could be
an additional way to avoid the anti-commandeering doctrine. All in
all though, this would not solve the overarching issue of a broadened
anti-commandeering doctrine preventing the Supreme Court from
reasoned analysis to protect individual liberty.
4. Reasonable Constraints on Anti-Commandeering
Even if these methods could be used in different factual
circumstances, is it realistic for the judicial branch to turn a blind eye
to the loss of liberty in vulnerable populations in order to follow a
doctrine not rooted in the text of the Constitution? There should be a
shift in anti-commandeering doctrine analysis that allows the Court to
realistically protect against harmful policy and yet still protect the
aims of the doctrine.
The best solution to balance federalism and policy considerations
is to set reasonable and articulable bounds on the anti-commandeering
141. Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L.
REV. 795, 807–08 (1996) (“[T]he New Deal Court’s own constitutional justification
for its radical expansion of the scope of federal power over commerce was that the
congressional measures in question were valid exercises of the power granted by
the Necessary and Proper Clause and were not direct exercises of the power to
regulate commerce among the several states. That is, the Court did not simply and
directly enlarge the scope of the Commerce Clause itself, as is often believed.
Rather, it upheld various federal enactments as necessary and proper means to
achieve the legitimate objective of regulating interstate commerce.”).
142. See Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
143. James Stocks & Co, Share of the online gambling market worldwide in
2015,
by
product,
STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/248655/segmentation-of-online-gamblingmarket/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2019) (illustrating that online gambling made up 48
percent of sports gambling worldwide in 2015).
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doctrine. The anti-commandeering doctrine has no explicit basis in the
text of the Constitution, as it was judicially created out of federalism
principles in New York and Printz.144 The previous legal arguments
can assist in narrowing the doctrine, but strict judicial constraints are
necessary to prevent the doctrine from stifling the protection of the
vulnerable. The anti-commandeering doctrine is not completely
unworkable, but it needs to be contained in a way to prevent judicial
overstep into Congress’ protection of the vulnerable.
First, the anti-commandeering doctrine should not be used to
strike a law that does not force state action. This preemption argument
was the respondent’s strongest in Murphy.145 This constraint on the
doctrine will allow Congress to regulate certain harmful activities
without forcing states to enforce the law. For example, say Congress
decided to ban certain prescription pain-killers because they were
found to be too addictive. If the law said that no state could legalize
and set up a state-sponsored pharmacy for this drug, it would not
commandeer the state to take action. Rather, Congress would be able
to regulate a dangerous drug and prevent its use without state
interference. This simple solution will allow Congress to weigh the
difficult policy decisions without forcing the state to take any actions
that the anti-commandeering doctrine is meant to protect.
Next, and most importantly, the judicial branch should have the
ability to step in to protect citizens from state law taking away their
liberty. If states have a perverse incentive to create a harmful law, the
anti-commandeering doctrine should not create a judicial blockade
preventing Congress from stopping it. One of the main mischiefs that
the anti-commandeering doctrine is meant to protect against is
government tyranny and the loss of individual liberty. Congress, and
in turn the courts, should have the ability to regulate addictive
behaviors that hurts vulnerable individual’s liberty even though it may
partially benefit a specific state.
Additionally, this action can be taken without forcing the state to
incur the cost of the regulation, another mischief that the doctrine is
144. See SCHWINN, supra note 11 (“Students of the Constitution can be excused
for scratching their heads at the anti-commandeering doctrine. That’s because this
rule, which says that the federal government can’t require states or state officials to
adopt or enforce federal law, has no basis in the text or history of the document. It
has only weak support in precedent.”).
145. Brief for Respondents, supra note 107 at 18 (“While PASPA requires states
to refrain from engaging in certain conduct and from embracing certain policies, it
does not force them to adopt federally-prescribed policies or to enforce federal
law.”).
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trying to protect against. Returning to the previous example, if,
hypothetically, the California legislature legalized a state-sponsored
pharmacy to help lower pain-killer prices and create valuable tax
revenue, Congress could respond by passing legislation that prevents
this state action. The legislation would be based on research that the
pain-killer was too addictive and took the liberty away from
vulnerable perpetual pain patients in the long run. This would prevent
California from setting up the state-sponsored pharmacy and outlaw
the pain-killer without shifting the cost of regulation onto the state. If
challenged in the courts, the law would unfortunately be struck due to
the Murphy decision. That decision emphasizes the anticommandeering doctrine’s protection of individual liberty, when in
reality its failure to analyze detrimental policy affects allows for a
decrease in liberty amongst the most vulnerable.
The main counter-argument to slimming the doctrine in the
context of PASPA is that it is consistently unclear whether a law
protects or harms. It is argued that states are “laboratories”146 for the
nation as a whole to experiment with the legalization of sports
gambling. This allows individuals the freedom to choose for
themselves whether they want to participate in a more regulated
gambling environment.147 Although these arguments are valid, they
ignore the prevalence of addiction in vulnerable populations and the
fact that upholding PASPA will actually increase liberty for
individuals and families.
The judicial branch should reverse course and limit the anticommandeering doctrine so that it does not cover a situation where
state incentives and the interests of the vulnerable come in conflict.

146. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (“To stay
experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of
the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the nation. It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may,
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
147. This argument assumes that individuals will use illegal and less regulated
means to sports gamble if it is outlawed on a federal level. See Gary Martin, Supreme
Court Strikes Down Law Banning Sports Betting Outside Nevada, LAS VEGAS
REVIEW-JOURNAL
(May
14,
2018)
https://www.reviewjournal.com/sports/betting/supreme-court-strikes-down-lawbanning-sports-betting-outside-nevada/ (“The American Gaming Association,
which represents casinos, praised the ruling, saying it could snuff out what it says is
a $150 billion a year black market that has thrived offshore and under the radar in
the U.S..”).
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The valid federalism principles148 upheld by the anti-commandeering
doctrine can be protected, while also allowing Congress to police
sports gambling that disproportionately harms susceptible citizens. A
judicially created Constitutional argument should not serve as a
barrier to legislation that protects these individuals. The judicial
branch serves as a valuable check on the legislative branches policy
analysis, but the court should curb the ever-expanding anticommandeering doctrine set forth in Murphy.
IV. CONCLUSION
Without federal oversight, legalized sports gambling will lead to
drastic societal problems by decreasing the personal liberty of
vulnerable populations via addiction. States will be incentivized to
authorize sports gambling schemes to create revenue from the pockets
of the vulnerable. To prevent this from happening, the judicial systems
must set reasonable bounds to constrain both the broad use of the anticommandeering doctrine and policy analysis. Are these neutral
principles possible in the judicial system? In one sense they are not;
when the Supreme Court analyzes constitutional issues, it simply
appears to be doing the same policy analysis that the legislature
undertakes. By strictly adhering to and expanding anticommandeering doctrine by shaping PASPA as simply an anti-state
liberty statute, the Supreme Court ignores the negative effects of
gambling. On the other hand, if a neutral principle were viewed as
realistic, judges could realize the limitations of the anticommandeering doctrine and set articulable limits on its use. These
limits include only using the doctrine to strike legislation that forces
explicit state action and when the state incentives do not conflict with
the protection of vulnerable citizens. Either way, by having a realistic
view of the modern court and allowing judges at every level to balance
state sovereignty and the necessity to legislate against harmful actions
can prevent the harm of a rigid view of anti-commandeering.
Otherwise, the same federalism debate will prevent Congress from
protecting citizens in a variety of future and present contexts. The
Supreme Court must fold on its Murphy decision, or else Congress’
hands will be tied for years to come.

148. Including, but not limited to, clear political accountability, preventing
regulation cost-shifting, and allowing states the freedom to legislate how they
choose. See Siegel, supra note 21.
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